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The War Aims of the Russian Provisional Government
by Susan Parker

History Honors Seminar
Dr. Ryle

January, 1969

The outbreak of the first World War marked the end of an era
in the history of Europe; novhere vas this to be more true than
in Russia.

At the outset there vas a great shov of popular support

for the var, much more so than for the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.
Anti-government and revolutionary activity had soon revived folloving
the temporary hiatus after the seemingly successful Revolution of 1905,
but it disappeared almost entirely in the rise of national feeling and
loyalty that accompanied the declaration of var on August 1, 1914.1
On July 8 the Duma met to vote on var credits, vhich vere
quickly adopted.

The parties of the left refused to vote for reasons

of principle, but they still joined in a call for national def ense.2
Outstanding revolutionaries like the Marxist/ Plekhanov/ and the
anarchist Prince Kropotkin supported the var, fearing that a German
victory vould mean the triumph of militarism and reaction.

In

addition, the Russian alliance with the western democracies , France and
England, appealed to some radical and liberal intellectuals.J The only
dissidents were emigrant social Democrat leaders such as Lenin and
Trotsky, who advocated turning the war into a civil war.

The Menshevika

supported the war to the extent of national defense, but they emphasized

4

a quick peace with no annexations or indemnities. · The conservative
newspaper Novoe Vremia in an article written three years later about the
beginning of the war said, "The people closed their ranks

~rouna

the

1

R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional
Government 1917: Documents (Stanford, California, 1961), I, 4. Hereafter
cited as Browder and Kerensky.
" Ibid.
3 W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-19?1 (New York,
1965), p. 64. Only the first volume of Chamberlin 1 s work was used as
source material; aD. page numbers refer to thst volume.

4 Ibid.

around the throne.

All political bickering stopped.

All political parties,

including the Social Democrats, united for the struggle against the foreign

foe."5l~Frustrated in the far east after 1905, dominance in the Balkans and
control of the straits had again become Russia's primary aims in foreign
policy. The government's policy in the Balkans led Russia into.the war, and
once the war had started, the imperial government began negotiations with)
the other Allied governments to make sure that its long cherished goals
would be realized{ i f the war ended successfully for the Allies.

In the

spring of 1915 Russia expressed the desire to annex certain territories at
the end of the war.

These territories were Constantinople, the Bosporus

and the Dardanelles, and certain adjacent islands and coastlines necessary
for free usage of them and their security. 6 Both France and Britain agreed
to the satisfaction of this demand upon Russian recognition of a series of
their claims in the Ottoman E.7ipire·'and other areas.
in 1915 was the formal acceptance of these terms.

The Treaty of London
Italy also agreed after

its entry into the war? Russia was promised Armenia, Erzerum, Trebizond,
and northern Kurdistan by the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916,8 and at the
Allied conference in Petrograd during January, 1917 Hussia obtainerl the
freedom to settle the eastern boundaries of Germany and Austria-Hungary
in the Briand-Pokrovskii Agreement. 9 The contents of these secret treaties
represented the war aims of the tsarist government.

Obviously it would

gain a great deal if the war were carried to a victorious copclusion by the
Allies.
5 Browder and Kerensky, I, 141.
6
Ibid., II, 1054-1055.

7

Ibid.

8
David Lloyd George, War.·l'1emoirs of David Lloyd George (Boston 1937)
IV, 86-87.
~
~ ~
'
'

9

Browder and Kerensky, II~ 1056-1057.

3
The patriotic glow of the first weeks of the war soon faded in Russia.
The demands of the var put unbearable strains on the country, and gradually
ond polir1 call)'·
Russia collapsed militarily, economically,;1 Military defeat and internal
conditions broke the morale of the country and caused the revival and growth
of pacifist and revolutionary feeling.lo

As the deprivations and the sense

of bitterness and hopelessness grew, so did the discontent.

Revolution or

drastic change seemed inevitable and to many people desirable, but no one
11
expected the collapse of the monarchy when it came on March l~.
Although
accompanied by riots, strikes, and meetings of the garrison in Petrograd,
the revolution was almost bloodless.

The tsarist government was not really

destroyed, it collapsed of !ts own corruption and ineptness.
The initial stages of the revolution were leaderless and spontaneous.l"'
f'rom the rubble two or[anizations arose that were to share political power
in the new Russia, the Temporary Committee of the Duma and the Soviet of
Workers!- and Soldiers' Deputies.

On March l"' the Duma created ann elected

a Temporary Committee to restore order and to establish relations with public
organizations and institutions; that evening it began workjto create a nev
government for Russia.13

The Soviet revived about the same time and also

created a Temporary Executive Committee.

From the first, it was the Soviet thar

commanded the loyalty of the majority of the population of the city, and it
quickly began to assume some of the duties of authority.14

It was obvious

that if the government to be set up by the Temporary Committee of the Duma
was to have any power, it must have the support of the Soviet.
lo

11
Chamberlin, p. 64.

1 " Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 83.

Ibid., p. 73.

13 Ibid,, pp. 81-8..,.

4
The Soviet rejected the idea of taking power itself; most of its leaders felt that this was the bourgeois revolution and that the socialist one
would follow.

Sukhanov, a Soviet member at the time, wrote that while avoid-

ing the responsibilities of power, the Soviet retained the right to criticize

15
and make demands on the government.
On March 14 an agreement between the Temporary Committee of the Duma
and the Executive Committee of the Soviet was reached.

The Duma Committee

accepted certain demands of the Soviet, mostly concerning civil rights and
the calling of a constituent assembly, and the Soviet issued a declaration

16
of support for the Provisional Government.

During the negotiations two

men, Paul Miliukov and Alexander Kerensky, stood out, and they were to be
the outstanding members of the Provisional Government.

Miliukov had been

the leader of the Constitutional Democrats in the Duma, and he now represented the more conservative groups in the country.

He played a leading role

in the negotiations, and Sukhanov wrote of him, "It was clear that Miliukov
17
here was not only a leader, but the boss of the right wing."
Kerensky
had also served in the Duma; he was a Truaovicb, a very moderate socialist.
His views were not actually in sympathy with those of most of the Soviet memhers, but he vas an emotional, stirring orator who had a way
had been elected to the Soviet's Executive Committee.

~ith

a mob and

He aocepted the

position of Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government, although the
18
other Soviet leaders opposed participation of its members in the cabinet.
G. M. Pal(olofUe, the French ambassador in Petrograd, recognized Kerensky's
importance at once, "His influence with the Soviet is great.

15

16
Browder and Kerensky, I, 117-118.

17
~.

He is a man

Ibid., p. 118.

Ibid., p. 1"0.

18

Chamberlin, p. 89.

5
we must try to win over to our cause.

He alone is capable of making the

Soviet realize the necessity of continuing the war and maintaining the alliance." 19

He correctly surmised Kerensky's views on the war, too.

In one of

the many addresses he made to mobs of soldiers in March, Kerensky told them

~o

that triey had a double obligationy carryiflg on the war and the revolution.

'-°

The new government/which had been formed/ was obvio1:sly going to
have to make a decision on the question of Russia's role in the war.

In

cetennining its position on this issue, the government was under pressure
from both internal and external bodies.

The factions within Russia had di-

vergent attitudes towards the war, and they each sought to bring the government's policy into

alignmen~

with their own.

The Allies also wanted the

Russian government's stand to be sympathetic to their policies.
Among the people and the army the desire for peace was intense.
Kerensky believed that Russia was physically tired and spiritually revolted
by the war and that the Russian people sought naively but honestly and sin-

?l
cerely an escape from the hopeless situation into which Europe had blundered.
During the first days of the revolution there were frequent rumors of
revolution in

German~

and they were widely accepted.

Kerensky attributed

these sentiments to a great popular faith " that the Russian Revolution
would kindle the fires of fraternity in the hearts of all the working people
of the world and that by common impulse the workman and peasants of all

.,..,

belligerent countries would put a stop to the patricidal war."

19
?0
'

/
G. M. Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs (New York, 19"'4), III, "'34.
A. F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe (New York, 19..,7), p. 35.

1 _ . , p.
Ibid

169 •

.,., Ib'
l.Q.i.d.' p. 50.

6
There vere tvo socialist attitudes towards the war.

The commencement

of war in 1914 had caused a crisis in international socialism.

The Inter-

national had traditionally adopted an anti-war, pacifist policy, denouncing
var as capitalist and imperialist; but when the war broke out, nationalism
proved stronger than socialism, and most European socialists remained loyal
to their governments and cooperated in the war efforts of their countries.
The few who refused to cooperate met at Zimmervald in Switzerland in 1915
and Zienthal in 1916 and denounced the

"capitalist~

var.

Socialism was

split into two camps, majority socialists who supported the war effort in
their countries and minority socialists who continued to oppose it.

In

Russia the greatest number of the socialists belonged to the moderate groups,
the Social Revolutionary Party and the Mensheviks, and had initially supported the imperial government in the war.

The revolution was accompanied

by a renewal of anti-war sentiment, which became more intense because of tre
possibility that peace might be achieved with the change in government.

All

patriotism and national feeling did not disappear overnight, however, and
the Soviet was dominated by reoderates until the end of the summer.
The Soviet position towards the war was not pacifist, but "defensist",
peace
it wanted to end the war quickly but not at the cost of a separat~with Germany.

It advocated restoring the

~~

army~

continuing the war, and at the same

ll

time0 urged the government to drop all annexationist claims and push the
Allies to a revision of the treaties with regard to the war aims.

The Sov-

iet's position was stated in an editorial in Izvestiia, the Soviet newspaper,
on March 31.

The editorial noted that the members of the Soviet did not de-

sire conquests but liberty for all people.

It said the Russians would

continue to fight to protect their liberty until the people of the AustroGerman coalition laid down their arms.~3
Browder and Kerensky, II, 1080.

It appealed to the people of

7

curope to push their governments to renunciation of conquests and adoption
of the principle of self-determination. More importantly, it also demanded
that the Provisional Government openly renouce policies of conquest."4 The
theme of "fighting to protect Russian liberty" reappeared in a later Izvestiia
editorial r

i-" ,;-

Whlclr pointed out the dangers of a separate peace, German victory

in the west and subsequent turning on Russia, and reminded the soldiers that
they were now defending the freedom of new Russia.~5 The socialists wanted
peace, but they had many reasons for continuing the war: to expel the enemy
from Ru:isian territory, to prevent a German offensive to take Petrograd and

restore tsarism, to destroy Prussian militarism, and to honestly fulfill

?6
the obligations to the

Allie~.

Even the Bolsheviks, the radical Russian socialists, lield a similar
position at first.

01'
1,

March

"5~Stalin,

Kamenev, and Muranov returned from

exile and took over Pravda, the party newspaper. In the March

~s

issue

Kamenev wrote that the Bolsheviks did not want a separate peace, but the
initiation by the Provisional
pea~e.

bring about a general

Govern.~ent

of steps toward negotiations to

He called for obedience and devotion to duty
~.

on the part of all Russians until

unil~teral

peace negotiations were possible.

1.VJTll.

The party wavered along these lines til± Lenin arrived in the middle of April
and gave it direction.

He held that war was an imperialist struggle between

the capitalists of the world for world domination and exhorted the people
to demand an immediate end to the war, to stop fighting the Germans, and
.,g
turn on the ruling classes.
Lenin was hardly a pacifist, for he advocated

"4 F. A. Golder, Documents of Russian History
Massachusetts, 1964), p. 3"6•
"5 Brovder and
.,7
"8

"ff

1

Kerensky~ .pp.

905-906 •

Chamberlin, p. 115.
lt

Browder and Kerensky ~P· 904-905.

,.,.,

~-1917

(Gloucester,

~6 Ibid., p. 1074.

8

transforming the var into a class struggle,
Refusal of military service, strike against var and
such things are mere stupidity, ••• vork directed to the transforming of the var of the peoples into civil var is the sole
socialist work in the epoch of the imperialistic armed clash
of the bourgeois classes of all nations ••• ?9
In the spring and summer of 1917 this program was far too radical for many
people in Russia, and Lenin started with little support; even most of the

JO

members of the Soviet thought he vas completely unrealistic.
ever, knew the possibilities of a wartime situation.

Lenin, how-

He represented the future,

not the present mood of the masses, and his radical viewpoint was eventually

Jl

to vin for the Bolsheviks their allegiance.
The conservative classes, the Cadets, and the right ving socialists
wanted victory in the war above all else.

On March 15 an editorial in

Russkiia Vedomosti, a conservative newspaper, declared that Russia needed
~~

above all " an executive power" wh±t:h-was aware of its responsibility to the
~

country and had the ability to lead Russia to victory in the war.

They

were thoroughly committed to prosecution of the war, maintenance of the
existing treaties with the Allies, and securing the aims recorded in those
treaties.

They considered the acquisition of the territories included in

the treaties as necessary for the future development and safety of Russia.
Miliukov was the spokesman of this group and while he was Foreign Minister,
the Cadet viewpoint dominated the Provisional Government.

He wanted above

all to maintain the treaties with the Allies, but he was forced by popular
demands to modify the language if not the intent of his statements somewhat,
~9 Browder and Kerensky,

I,

1~8.

30 Chamberlin,
p. 118.
3?
Browder and Kerensky, I, 143.

31 Ibid., p. 119

9
emphasizing the "liberating" nature of the Yar and the desire for peace.33
He was reluctant to do even this because it alarmed the Allied governments
so much.

He was completely a traditionalist as far as the national problems

and interests of Russia were concerned.
The attitude of the Allies toward Russia after the revolution Yas amibiguous. Essentially they were willing to support any government that continued
to participate in the war.

They had considerable financial reasons for wanting

to maintain a sympathetic government; England had made extensive loans to
both the imperial and the Provisional governments, and France, the United
34
States, Japan, and Italy had ,Uso extended credit.
Militarily Russia had
done poorly in the Yar, but the Russian contribution should not be underrated;
through forcing the Central Powers to maintain troop strength in the east,
it had taken pressure off France and England on the western front.

The

American Ambassador, David Francis, recognized this and decided that it was
very important that the Russian army continue to maintain the eastern front,
in order to prevent the transfer of German units to the battlefields of Franc~5
It was generally hoped in the Allied countries that the revolution was at
least partially a protest against suspected pro-German influences at the old

J6
Court and that it would mean more vigorous prosecution of the var by Russia.
The message of Lloyd George to the Premier, Prince Lvov, on March
ical of the greetings to the new [OVernment.

~4

was typ-

~~h~

It expressedl\on the part of

Great Britain that Russia had become a democracy and confidence that thi1t33 Chamberlin, p. 107.

34 Browder and Kerensky, I, 508.

35 David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy, April, 1916-

November, 1918 (Ne\l York, 19~1), pp:-1'?4-1~5.
3 6 Chamberlin, p. 103.

10

this development vould strengthen the·determination of the Russian people
37
to prosecute the var until the Central Powers were defeated.
At the same time the Allies were worried by the war weariness, the
army
shattered economy, the cru.mblin!Jf, and the emergence of political elements
that demanded an end to the war or alteration of Allied and Russian war
38
In spite of noble phrases about liberty and democracy struggling
aims.
apainst oppression,

AlLit~

the~~had

no intention of giving up the acquisitions

promisea to them in the treaties.

All

thei~

sympathy and support was ac-

companied by admonitions against changing the war aims, encouraging
strengthening the

go~ernment

and the army, and going through with plans

made for a joint Allied offensiye in spring 1917.

They could not uhder-

stand the delicate balance the Provisional Government had to maintain
between the various shades of opinion at home in order to secure support.
Maurice Pal{ologue, the French Ambassa~or, continued to nemand that Miliukov
issue a plain and completely unambiguous statement on Russia's intentions in
the var, the one thing it was impossible for him to do.

After reading the

first declaration of the Provisional Government, he vent to Miliukov and
angrily told him,
A determination to prosecute the var at any cost and until
full and final victory isn't even mentioned! The name of Germany
does not occur! There isn't the slightest allusion to Prussian
militarism: No reference whatever to our var aims!39
Miliukov was constantly having to reassure the Allies of Russia's determination not to make a separate peace or revise her var aims.

Disturbed

by the Allied attitude and actions, Kerensky felt that the Allies were un40
dermining the Provisional Government.
The position of Russian representatives
at Allied councils deteriorated, important decisions vere made without consulting
37 Lloyd George, II, 507.
38
39

Brovder and Kerensky, II, 1039-1041.
/

Paleologue, III,

~54.

40

Kerensky, p. viii.

11

the Russian delegates, sharp notes were sent to the government about internal
affairs, and supplies from the Allies fell below what was promised and some41
times were defective.
The Provisional Government officially had come into existence on March

16. Kerensky was the only socialist member; conservative attitudes predominated among the rest of the Cabinet members.

Besides Miliukov as Minister

of Foreign Affairs, the other members of importance were: Prince G. E. Lvov Premier and Minister of the Interior, A. I. Gutchkov - Minister of War and
Ma~ine,

and M. G. Tereshchenko - Minister of Finance.

government made its first declaration.

4"'

On March 19, the

On the subject of the war it promised,

"to provide our army with everything necessary to bring the war to a victor43
ious conclusion."
The government also bound itself explicitly to fulfill
'Unswervingly" the allQances that had been concluded between the tsar and tre
Allies.

Ignoring the evidence of popular anti-war sentiment, the government
44
expressed confidence that it was executing 1he will of the people".
On March 17, Miliukov prepared the government's first statement on

foreign policy.

It was in the form of a note to the Russian ambassadors

abroad to be communicated to the foreign ministers of the countries which
they served.

It declared that the new Russian government would "follow the

democratic principles of consideration toward the small and the great nations,
45
of freedom of their development, ann of good understanding amo'I'€ peoples"
but it emphasized Russia's determination to observe the agreements contracted
46
The contents of
by the old regime and to prosecute the war to victory.

41 Brovder and Kerensky,

r+,

1040.

4'? Kerensky, p. 109.
43 Browder and Kerensky, I, 157.
45 I bi~.,
II, p. 104".

44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.

this note suggest that it was intended to assure the Russian allies of Russia's
continuing participation in the var.

It included phrases about protection

of the rights of small nations and the desire for peace, but these were used
\"" ~'< ,_

by the western Allies too and ,hardly likely to arouse concern.

A fev days

later Mi.liukov requested and quickly received from the Allies confirmations

47
of the agreements made by the imperial government.

Obviously the revolu-

tionary government had not abandoned the var aims of the tsarist regime.
The Soviet, however, reflecting the anti-war wishes of most of the people,
found Miliukov's statements unsatisfactory.

Although the exact terms of tm

treaties made by the imperial government were still secret, the intentions
toward Constantinople, the straits, and the Balkans were well known, and the
Soviet began to press the government to renounce all annexationist views.

48

All the members of the Provisional Government felt that Russia should continue the war to a decisive victory in collaboration with the Allies for the
sake of national interests, but after learning of the terms of the secret
treaties, they recognized the need for altering at least the phraseology of
Russia's var aims to reflect the opinions generally held by the public and
49

supported by the majority of the Soviet.
completely opposed.

Miliukov vas the only Minister

Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and Lvov favored the issuing

of a declaration as demanded by the Soviet, and they persuaded their colleagues.
Reluctantly Miliukov drafted a document vith the aid of his associates; it
vas a compromise between Miliukov's views and the wording requested by the
Soviet, and it was published as a domestic statement, not a diplomatic note.
The declaration was released on April 9, and al though it mentioned that the
gove~runent

intended to observe the obligations to the Allies and def end the

country's rights, it firmly asserted that the government's aim was
47 Browder and Kerensky, II, 104~.
48

lbig.,p. 101+5.

49 Ibid., p. 1039.

~not

13
domination over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, or
forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of a stable
50
It defined the
peace on the basis of the self-determihation of peoples."
army's task as being the nefense of Russia and the freeing of Russian terri51
tory held by the enemy.
About the same time Kerensky in an interview given a British journalist,
advocated the internationalization of the straits and Constantinople.
the interview vas published in Britain,
British government.

When

it caused an uneasy reaction in the

I'/

On AprilAMiliukov sent a note to the Russian embassies

in Rome, Paris, and London refuting Kerensky's statement and reassuring the
Allies that Russia would not renounce the treaties because they obtained certain "vital interests" for the country.

The note also stated that the Russian

5?
public and army firmly supported the 'government's position.
These words may have been soothing to the Allies, but they were not
truthful.

In reality, the views of the population vere much closer to those

of the Soviet.

It was natural that the Soviet's ains should be so close to

those of the population, since it was composed of directly elected representatives of the people.

Soon after the revolution the Soviet issued an

"Appeal to the Peoples of all the World."

Announcing the fact of revolution

in Russia, the Appeal called for all people to commence a struggle against
53
~the acquisitive ambitions of all countries" and make the question of var
or peace their decision.

Through this·, it proposed, international unity

could be restored and the liberation of man achieved, the aims to which the
Russian people were pledged.

The Appeal affirmed the determination of the

Russian democracy to oppose the policy of conquest and to achieve peace.

It

included the Soviet's reason for continuing to support the war effort, pro50 Browder and Kerensky, II, 1046.

5~ Ibid., 1057-1058.

5l Ibid.

53 ~-, p. 1077.

14
tection of the achievements of the revolution.

54

The government, however, ignored the popular demand for a change in
war aims expressed in the Soviet's pronouncements.

To the Allied ambassadors

it especially emphasized its decision not to alter the war policy. Sir George
Buchanan, the British ambassador, obtained unofficial reassurances from
Miliukov that the Provisional Government was determined to restore discipline
55
in the anny and continue the war before he would recognize the government.
Miliukov made the same statement to Paleologue, but the French ambassador
couldn't accept the discrepancy between the public and private or diplomatic
pronouncements of the governrr.ent. He continued to insist on certainty in the
government's statements.

Miliukov explained the difficulty of working with
56
the Socialists and the necessity of keeping their support.
When Pal(ologue
became angry over the Provisional Government's first declaration, Miliukov

attempted to point out the need for duplicity, "he argued that the manifesto
57
Francis also interviewwas intended specifically for the Russian nation."
ed Miliukov on the 18th of March, but was satisfied with information he received
and recorded in his journal, "Rodzianko and Miliukov both assure me that the
58
Provisional Goverru.~ent will vigorously prosecute the war."
The Allied ambassadors, despite constant reasurances, recognized that
the Soviet had all real power.

On Pal(ologue 1 s suggestion, Britain and France

sent socialist delegations from their countries to Russia to persuade the
59
Soviet to adopt a pro-war stand.
The Allied Socialists arrived in April.
They were cooly received in the Soviet and attempted to make conciliatory
statements which upset Pal{ologue and Miliukov very much.

Miliukov ana

Kerensky both warmly greeted the delegates on behalf of the govern.~ent on
54

Bro"Wder and Kerensky, II, 1077-1078.
56
/
Paleologue, III, "48.
58
Francis, pp. 90-90.

55 _.,
Ibid
p. 1043.
57
Ibid., p. "55.
59
/
Paleologue,
III, ,.,54.

15
April 18, but their two speeches indicate the differences of opinion in the
Cabinet at the time.

Hiliukov spoke first, emphasizing that the ne-w Russia

60

was more determined than ever to prosecute the war and end German militarism.
Afte~ards

Kerensky made an ad~ress, but of a different tone.

that the Russian

de~ocracy

had renounced all

ap~ression

He announced

and imperialism and

urged the French and English peoples to force their ''bourgeois classes" to
61
do the same thing.
Paltalogue w~s very pessimistic about the situation in Russia when he
was recalled in May.

He was sure that the national effort would weaken and
6.,
that France's aims in eastern Europe would have to be altered. He didn't doubt

Miluikov's willingness to continue the var, but felt the new forces must be
taken into account.

He didn't believe even the Soviet could control the mob
63
and feared Russia would make separate peace with Germany.
Francis, in contrast, remained very enthusiastic about the revolution.

He was just as eager

as Pal~logue for Russia to ren:ain in the var, but was delighted at the
government's emphasis on the war being dedicated to fre€dom, democracy, and
I
t_ I_ •

peace. t,ov,._, ·

The American entry into the war heightened Francie' ebullience.

Miliukov,

however, was worried by Presinent Wilson's statements on Allied war aims,
particularly the phrase "peace without annexations."

On May 3 he issued a

declaration on Russia's var aims apropos of American participation in the
war.

Miliukov expressed the idea that the Allied task in the war vas the

reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires with the liberation of the nationalities oppressed by them.

He included among the particular

goals of the Allies "creation of an independent Czechoslovakian state ••• the
60

Browder and Kerensky, II, 1051.
6.,
/
Paleologue, III, "98.

61

Ibid.

6J Ibirl., p. "45.

16
return of Italians to Italy, of Pumnnians to Rumania, the natural unifiestion of the Serbian people, and also the union of the Ukrainian population
64

of the Austrian regions vith the population of our ovn Ukrainian regions ••• "
He firmly and explicitly asserted that the straits must come into Russian
possession and that neutralization of them vas less acceptable than Turkish
control.

I7deference to the American President, he stated that these goals

vere in accordance vith Wilson's principles ana could not be consiaered as
65

annexations.

This statement vas a bombshell in the Cabinet, vhich split

into tvo camps, those vho supported Miliukov and those vho supported Kerensky,
vho came out in favor of neutralization of the Dardanelles and no annexations.
Francis believed the majority of the Cabinet shared Kerensky's viev.

An up-

roar vas also raised in the Soviet over the statement; Miliukov had failed
66

to consult the Soviet before releasing it.
This incident added to the graving tension between the Provisional
Government and the Soviet, which continued to demand a revision of the
government's var sins.

Miliukov remained unwilling to alter drastically

even the phraseology of the government's statements in deference to the

67

Soviet, for fear of alienating the Allies.
In a conversation with Am/
bassador Paleologue he said, "if the Soviet got its vay (on var aims) I

68
should resign my office at once!"
Kerensky represented the view of the Soviet in the discussions vith
Miliuko~

and gradually he von the support of most of the rest of the Cabinet.

The struggle came to a head vhen Kerensky and the Soviet forced Miliukov to
64
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send a copy of the April 9 declaration--of the government to the Allies.
Miliukov insisted that the declaration vas a compromise between the opinions
69
in Russia and couldn't be sent to the Allies without an explanation.
The
government accepted this position, and the accompanying explanatory note was

70
edited by the entire Cabinet and published on May 1.

The note said,

Imbued with this new spirit of liberated democracy, the
pronouncements of the Provisional Government naturally cannot
give any reason to think that the revolution which has taken
place will lead to the weakening of Rus~ia's role in the common struggle of the Allies ••• It goes without saying, as stated
in the attached document, that the Provisional Government,
while defending the rights of our motherland, vill ~ully observe
the obligations taken with respect to our Allies ••• 1
.
The reaction in the streets and in the Soviet began

imrnediat~ly.

·It

vas not so much that the content was offensive as that Miliukov's name had
7.,
become a symbol of imperialism.
Street demonstrations on May 3 and 4 demanded Miliukov's resignation.

On May 5 the government issued another

explanatory note with a tone more conciliatory to the public; it was accepted
by the Soviet.

The government had already decided , nevertheless, that

Hiliukov must be shifted to a less dangerous place in the Cabinet and that
some of the Soviet leaders should be included in the government.

73

The

conservative groups hoped that this would assure more support for the
government and gain backing for a planned offensive.

74

Miliuko·1 refused to

accept the position of Minister of E.ducation and resigned on May 8; Gutchkov
also resigned because of discouragrnent with the continued disintegration of

75

the army.
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18
During the period of the crisis Kerensky had been attempting to persuade
the Soviet to join in a coalition government; after negotiations over terms
it accepted.

It joined on the conait.i.on that the government direct its

foreign policy towards securing a peace based on self-determination of

1

people~

~j~.:.•••',., rf

,ne

annexations or indemnities, and preparations for negotiations with the

76
The Soviet agreed to support an offensive

Allies on revising the treaties.

at the front, having recognized that its appeals were not activating much
response abroad and hoping that there vould be more reaction if Russia were

77
in a strong position militarily.

In the new Cabinet, Kerensky became

Minister of War; five other Socialists were included; and the rest of the
posts were filled with conservatives and non-socialist moderates, including
Tereshchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Prince Lvov remained. as

Premie~

but from the start Kerensky dominated, and together with Tereshchenko and
Nekrasov ran the government.
The issue of var aims had caused the change in government, and the policy of the coalition was determined by a desire to avoid any conflict with
the Soviet on this subject.

The government took no firm or concrete steps

to repudiate the war aims of the imperial or the previous revolutionary
governments, but it adopten a policy of conciliation vith the Soviet as far
as possible.

The Cabinet was completely willing to adjust its public and

diplomatic language and methods so as not to alienate the Soviet and the
people.

It maintained this new stand towards the Allies as well as the

Russian public, perhaps feeling secure that the Allies would never consent
to a revision of the existing treaties even if the Russian government officially asked for a conference to consider this.

The government's true

position can only be judged by its deeds; it never renounced or even made

76
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19
put:lic the secret treaties with the Allies. The war aims had not significant-

ly changed from those represented by the treaties, although the government's
public pronouncements concealed this.

On May 18, the day after it was

organized , the coalition government issued a declaration of its program.
It adopted as its aim in foreign policy the establishment of a general peace
without annexations or indemnities ann based on the right of self-determination.

In answer to the demands of the Soviet, the government promised to

take measures towards a revision of the inter-allies agreements.

The

decleration also stated that the government was convinced that an Allied
defeat would make the conclusion of a just peace impossible and that therefore
?8
This idea and the idea of
the Russian army would continue to fight.
national defense were the reasons used by the Provisional Government to justify
its participation in the war and to create public support for this participation.
Tereshchenko, the Foreign Minister, was a wealthy young manufacturer_,!-'
vho belonged to no political party.

He proved to be fairly agile in main-

taining a balance between not seriously offending the Allied governments ann
keeping on good terms with the Soviet.
the press discussing his program.

On May 19 he issued a communique to

Russia wanted to establish peace as soon

as possible, he noted, but it could not break its ties with the Allies
without betraying its honor.

Peace must be vithout annexations or indemnities

and based on the right of self-determination;
peace.

it must be an international

The new Foreign Minister coDllllitted the government to take steps to

arrange a conference with the Allies concerning ways to secure peace.

He

maintained that the Allies could hardly be considered as annexationists at
a tin:e when P..ussia, Belgium, France, and Serbia were occupied by the Germans.
78
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Tereshchenko also observed that the Russian army must be prepared to continue
fighting and even take the offensive if Russia were to be in the position of

79
strength necessary for achieving its aims.
Kerensky's task as Minister of War was to restore the fightine capacity
80
of the army.
The government harl definitely decided on an offensive for the
early summer.

The conservatives hoped the offensive would bring a successful

end to the war and terminate the upheaval at home, and the moderate socialists
thought it would raise Russia's prestige and force the Allies and Germany to
81
Kerensky was acceptable to both
take its peace program more seriously.
croups.

Izvestiia wrote on his appointment, "From now on, the Ministry of

war will be headed by a minister who is a revolutionary to whom the ~r~y can
8?
Kerensky began a
blindly and without reservations entrust its fate."
round of visits to anny units; his program was to make appeals to the soldiers
an~

to take certain

a~ministrative

measures to make use of the democratic

institutions in the army. "Forward to the battle for freedom!" was his slo8.3
ran.
The offensive began on July 1, and was initially successful; once
faced with strong German units,

ho~ever,

it collapsed completely.

24 the whole episode was over, and the state of the army was

wors~

By July
84
than ever.

The hopes that an offensive at the front would lead the country out of the
crisis were destroyed.
On July 15, four Cadet Ministers resigned from the Cabinet in protest
against the failure of the Socialist ministers to restore the army or control
85
the workers.
Soldiers anc workers began demonstrations calling for the

79 Browder and Kerensky, II, 1103-1104.

80

81

8? Ibid., II, 919.

Browder and Kerensky, I, 165.

BJ Kerensky, p. 195.
85

Ibin,,, p. 1 69.

Kerensky, p. 184.

84 Chamberlin, p. 164.

?l
Soviet to assu::1e all power.

The demonstrations grew and there were suspicions

of a Bolshevist coup, but the Bolshevik leaders did not feel that the time
was ripe to seize control.

The unrest reached a peak an July 17, and the

powerless government could do nothing to restore order in Petrograd.
Soviet too was unable to control the mob.

The

The Provisional Government ann

the Soviet were in a helpless position until the demonstrators, lacking a
86
definite goal, were rliscouraged by the arrival of loyal troops.
After struggling for several days and at one point even resigning temporarily, Kerensky was able to create a new coalition government with himself
ns Prime Minister on August 6.

Supposedly the members renounced all party

ties in order to be completely free to take the steps necessary to save the
country; actually there were more socialist members than non-socialists, but
87

Thia change in the Provisional

they were generally right-wing socialists.

Government resulted in no changes in foreign policy or war aims. The Soviet
88
continued to give the government and its policies resolute support. The
Allies, seriously frightened by the ominous developments, became more anxious and demanding, and Tereshchenko sent another reassuring dispatch to

89

them.
The July Days, however, had other results that were far reaching. In
reaction the government and the conservative classes pushed further right,
and suppression of the Bolsheviks and other radical leftists began.

The

mood of the people became more radical, and they were more insistent on the
acccmplishment of their demands.

The Provisional Government harl failed to

solve the basic problems confronting the country; both the conservative elements in the population and the masses-of workers and soldiers began to
look elsevhere.
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The conservative reaction centered in the Kornilov conspiracy to take
over the government from the right.

The plot led by General Kornilov failed
tlle
to oust the Provisional Government, but it was111mmediate impetus for its down-

90

fall. The discontented masses were aroused to revolutionary action,

and the

distrust created between the socialists groups and the conservative ones resulte<l in the gradual failing of moderation even in the Soviet. On September

91
The government again turned to the

13 it adopted a Bolshevik resolution.

right for support, which alienated it even more from the people. Its goals
were meaningless for most Russians.

It refused to publicly alter its basic

position in foreign affairs, and put forward no real answers to the popular
~ernands

for "bread" and "land" either.
cov.p

The rapid decline after the Kornilovl\came at a time when Kerensky
~elieved

e.,.u llv.JGr

he had hopes of b6ing

aoJ.~

te oRd some of the internal pressure on

the governrr.entj'through achieving peace on the southwestern front.
ted by the increasingly radical

atmos~here

Motiva-

in Russia, Kerensky had reconsid-

ered the techniques if not the basic goals of his foreign policy.

Although

the government would not consider a separAte peace with Germany, and had
ignored several Gennan offers because of a sincere fear of German intentions,
it vas seriously considering an offer from Austria-Hungary.

Without Berlin's

knowledge the government of Austria-Hungary had requested the Provisional
9'>
Govern~ent for a separate peace.
Tereshchenko had been preparing a plan
for negotiations with Bulgaria and Turkey to bring about their exit from the
war.

With Austria corrmencing the move, Kerensky felt certain that Bulgaria

and Turkey would soon follow its example.

He hoped to arrange a peace in
93
the southwest an~ secure some type of Russian control over the straits.
90 Chamberlin, p. "77.
Kerensky, p.
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This arrangement was being made without the knowledge of the Allies.

Typically

for ~iplomatic maneuvres, it was proeressing very slowly; too slowly to be an
advantage for the Provisional Government.
During the late swmner and fall the Provisional Government was also
making plans for an Allied conference to be held in Paris.

The Soviet had

demanded such a conference since spring; it wanted a discussion of the Allied
treaties and agreements with revision of the var aims as a goal.
as early as April 15, Tseretelli, a Soviet leader, said,

~we

In Izvestiia

are declaring

that the Russian democracy considers it necessary for the Provisional Government to enter into negotiations with the Allied powers for the purpose of
94
vorking out a general agreement on this platform (no annexations)·•'.•'!
This
demand vas repeated in ,µ.most every pronouncement the Soviet ma.de.

Finally

in June, Tereshchenko prepared a note proposing an Allied conference and sent
it with Thomas, the French Socialist, when he left Russia.
note was published in Russia.

On June 16 the

Pledging loyalty to the Allied cause, it

proposed the convening, as soon as the situation became favorable, of an
Allied conference to revise the agreements on the subject of the basic aims
of the var.

The only agreEment that was not to be considered was the one
95
vbich obligated each country not to conclude a separate peace.
No invitations were sent through official diplomatic channels at that time, however.
The move was heartily endorsed by the Socialist organizations and press.

96

In July Bakhmet'ev, the Russian ambassa0or in Washington, recommended
to Tereshchenka that the United States be invited to the proposed conference,
because America was giving oirect support to the democratic direction in
Russian foreign policy and would ·probably support Russia at the conference.
94
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On July ,,g Tereshchenko cabled a reply to Bakhmet'ev agreeing with him on
the wisdom of securing of American support, but informing him that the proposed conference must be postponed in view of the failure of the offensive
and the July Days; tie emphasized that all efforts were to be concentrated
97
on the continuation of the war.
After several further postponements the conference was definitely
scheduled for Paris on Noveraber 16.

The Russian delegates were to be

Tereshchenko, General Alekseev, and one representative to be elected by
98
Kerensky issued an appeal on October "4 which
the revolutionary democracy.
stated the government's policy on the conference.
representatives at the

He said that the Russian

would work to reach "the solution of common
99
questions an0 military problems" and an arreement with the Allies based on
conferen~e

the principles of the new Russia.

At the same time, he concluded, the

government would continue its war efforts for the country and the "common,
100
Allierl cause."

The Executive
Soviet's delegate.

~mmittee

of the Soviet drew up instructions for the

They wanted an aereement to be concluded on war aims

based on the principles of no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination.
The instructions also included several specific suggestions on territorial
matters, such as neut!·alization of the straits, and it had guarantees to prevent future wars, such as abolition of secret treaties, elimination of
economic blockades, and gradual disarmament.

It endorsed the creation of

a League of Nations, if all states were to be on equal footing, and it
proposed Allied negotiations with Germany and Austria-Hungary as soon as they
101
renounced seizure by force.
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The Soviet's instructions cau~ed great confusion and discontent in the
Allied countries, and tr1ere vas even the possibility of excluding Russia from
the conference. Tereshchenko condemned the Soviet for this presumption of
10?
authority.
The newspaper Rech' expressed the conservative attitude toward
the conference, "this formula· (no annexations or indemnities) obviously does
r.ot take into account the vital interest of the Russian people and no support
103
c~ be found in i t for defending the dignity of Russia as a great power."
These debates were futile, ho'Wever, because as Kerensky hinted, the Allied
governments had already decided to limit the discussion to definite military
plans. Then the Bolshevik revolution toppled the Provisional Government before the date of the conference.
One of the aims of

~he

Russia did not participate in it.

Soviet's instructions to its delegate to the

Allied Conference was for the Allied nations to remove all barriers to the
104
Stockholm Conference.
This conference had also Peen'a goal of the Soviet
since at least early summer.

In the spring of 1917 Dutch and Scandinavian

socialists, inspired by the revolution and the Soviet, began efforts to call

an international socialist conference.

A representative was sent to Russia

to secure the cooperation of the Soviet.

In spite of the opposition of the

Bolsheviks, the Executive Committee of the Soviet approved a resolution to
call a conference.

The Russian-Dutch-Scandinavian Committee issued an invi-

tation to a conference of minority and majority socialists to be held in
Stockholm beginning August "·

The purpose of the conference was to consider

the world war, the International, the peace program of the International,and ~ethods for realizing this program and bringing the war to an end soon~05

The Soviet also called for a conference.
10?
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On May 15 the Soviet made an appeal
lOJ Ibid., p. 1157.
105
Ibid., pp. 1169-1170.

'>6

to the socialists of the world urging support for the conference. The appeal
jl ~llC t'

said that the"Russian Revolutionary Democracy" did not want a separat9f which
would leave Gennany and Austria free to deal with~he western Allies and "would
·r
106
be a betrayal of the cause of the worker's democracy of all countries."
It called upon the Allied socialists to force their rovernments to abandon
plans for annexations and concluded with an appeal to Austro-German social107
ists to bring an end to the war in order to save the revolution.
The idea of a conference was favorably received by many socialists,
but the Allied governments were hostile.
to issue passports to delegates.

On May

~1

the United States refused

In June, Frande and Italy followed suit,

and on August 13 Great Britain did likewise.

In announcing this, Lloyd George

read a letter from Tereshchenko in which the Foreign Minister wrote that although the government couldn't prevent Russian delegates from going, it regarded the conference as a party affair, not binding on the government.
Lloyd George also said that he had received information that Kerensky opposed
the conference.

Both Kerensky and Tereshchenko made denials of these

108

statements.

Lloyd George was aware of their reasons for doing this and

commented, "This last point was the really difficult aspect of the problem.
M. Kerensky was still struggling with the power of the Soviet, and to some
extent dependent on its good will. He dare not announce his open opposition
109

to it ••• n

After the British incident the Provisional GoverIDrient made a

statement on the Stockholm Conference on August 15.
government considered the solution to

th~

It announced that the

problems concerning war and peace

as exclusively the responsibility of the Russian and Allied governments.
106 Browder and Kerensky, II, 117~.
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The

statement repeated. that the Stockholm Conference vas a meeting of specific
political parties and could not make decisions binding on the governments.
Denying that the Provisional Government intended to refuse passports to
Russian socialists planning to attend the Conference, it said that both the
Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had advised the Allied
110
governments not to -,obstruct the convention of the Gonf erence.
This
protestation did not move the Allied governments to reverse their decisions;
111
consequently the Stockholm Gonf erence never took place.
While the demand for peace vas growing more urgent, the Provisional
Government remained inflexible on the subject of war

al~.

ln~late

October

when the Council of the Republic met, the government again affinned the same
basic goals.

Only two weeks before the Bolshevik coup, Tereshchenko told

the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council that the minimum conditions for
the conclusion of a peace vere access to the Baltic Sea, access to the south11~

ern seas, and assurance of economic independence.

These aims precluded

hostile foreign control of the straits and self-determination in Poland,
llJ
Lithuania, or Latvia.
This speech was made to a private session of the
committee. Public and diplomatic pronouncements were still made in a different
tone, obviously used to appease the popular claI:lOr. According to Kerensky,
"the language of her diplomacy and her diplomatic methods ••• did not, of course,
~ll4

in any way prejudice Russia's actions after victory.
It was ironic that even late in October the Provisional Government vas
not attempting to satisfy the demands-of the Russian masses.

The mutiny of

110 Browder and Kerensky, II, 1183-1184.
111 Chamberlin, p.
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the army, the peasant seizures of iand, and the growing radicalism of the
workers' demands continued.
sentiment had gone

beyon~

There was no room for compromise.

the moderate views of the Soviet.

Public

The passionate

desire for the end of the war was a major factor in the growth Bolshevist
influence among the people.
ended in Russia by fall 1917.

Patriotism as far as the war was concerned had
The one desire was for peace.

By failing to

answer this demand, the Provisional Government brought about its own downfall.

November 7 all of Lenin's work capitalizing on the popular anti-war

sentiment came to fruition; the Provisional Government fell with almost no
115
struggle. Kerensky fled Russia on the 14th.
With the success of the
Bolsheviks the question of war aims became a dead issue.

Bound by the

desires that brought them to power, the Bolsheviks' solution to the problem
was predetermined.

They had agitated for an end to the war, and they

realized this goal, at first by ceasing all fighting and then officially in
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
115 Chamberlin, p. JJ?.
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